The Normativity of the Sciences

Science functions as institutionalised criticism directed toward the acquisition of knowledge, and its principal claim is the method‑regulated pursuit of relevant truths rather than any truth. This dual claim must be explained and justified in the face of two pressures: a misplaced faith in science that idealises it as a mere supplier and custodian of secured knowledge, and activist challenges that threaten academic freedom by subordinating science to political expediency.

Professor Ladwig will present a rational reconstruction of scientific practices that exposes their normativity without inviting false idealisations; instead, science should protect us from narrow‑mindedness through methodological critique. An activist imposition of political usefulness on science is detrimental to this protective role, because scientific inquiry remains focused on relevant, not arbitrary, truths. Consequently, the selection of theories is not determined solely by the empirical evidence supporting their truthfulness; it is also co‑determined by normative considerations of a non‑epistemic nature. This argument will be illustrated at the end with the example of theories of rationality.